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A GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE-OR GOVERNMENT AND
PRISONER: GRANTING RELIEF TO AN ERRONEOUSLY RELEASED
PRISONER IN VEGA v. UNITED STATES
"The government is not permitted to play cat and mouse with the
prisoner, delaying indefinitely the [expiration] of his debt to society and
his reintegration into the free community."1
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2007, The Boston Globe reported the shocking tale of
Rommel Jones, an inmate who was held in prison four years longer than
his criminal sentence. 2 In the article, prison officials blamed the error on
the prison's computer system, which tracked time served, credits for good
behavior, and other factors affecting the length of criminal sentences.
3
1. Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging com-
mon law rule that government cannot require service of criminal sentence in in-
stallments and, therefore, prison sentence runs continuously from date defendant
begins serving it even if prisoner is erroneously released). In Dunne, Chief Judge
Posner used the phrase "play[ing] cat and mouse" to describe the actions of the
government in releasing prisoners only to reincarcerate them later. See id. (sug-
gesting that rule against installment punishment protects against arbitrary use of
governmental power). The phrase "to play cat and mouse" is a common idiom
used to describe a situation in which one person tries to defeat another person by
tricking him or her into making a mistake in an effort to gain an advantage later.
See CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS (2d ed. 1998), available at
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/play+at+and+mouse (last visited Jan. 19,
2008) (defining phrase "play cat and mouse"). This phrase is based on the way a
cat plays with a mouse before killing it. See id. (providing etymology of phrase).
2. See Thomas Farragher, Correction System 'Mess' Held Inmates Past Their Time,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.boston.com/
news/local/ massachusetts/ articles/ 2007/04/ 22 / correction system-mess held_
inmates-past their time (last visitedJan. 19, 2008) (reporting story of inmate held
in Massachusetts prison system four years longer than original sentence due to
negligence of prison officials).
3. See id. (noting that prison officials admitted inmate was held too long be-
cause they relied on computer system that could not adequately account for time
off for good behavior, disciplinary history and arcane court guidelines affecting
length of criminal sentences). The Boston Globe article also mentioned a previous
whistleblower case in which a prison employee complained that she was trans-
ferred for complaining that inmates were being held past their release dates. See id.
(discussing prior complaints regarding prison's sentence computation system).
The prison's correction commissioner testified in this case and admitted that the
department sentence tracking system had become so "dysfunctional" that
sentences needed to be verified manually. See id. at A20. (noting prison official's
admission regarding inadequacy of sentence computation system). The prison sys-
tem has since instituted a new computer network, the Inmate Management Sys-
tem. See id. (describing prison system's efforts to improve accuracy of sentence
calculations). Nevertheless, the prison classification director admitted that the
consequences of some court decisions are still beyond the capability of the new
computer system. See id. (highlighting weaknesses in department's new sentence
(385)
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The unveiling of this miscalculation sparked a further investigation by the
United States Department of Corrections to determine if other inmates
were similarly affected.4 As a result of this investigation, government offi-
cials identified thirteen other inmates who had been detained beyond
their release dates for periods ranging from a mere one day to an astound-
ing 515 days.
5
While stories of inmates being held in prison too long are undoubt-
edly shocking, even more alarming is the high number of inmates who are
released too early. 6 Our society assumes that after an individual is con-
victed and sentenced to serve jail time, the individual is taken into custody
and incarcerated until the sentence expires. 7 Contrary to this assumption,
prison officials sometimes mistakenly release prisoners before their
sentences expire, or fail to take convicted criminals into custody within a
reasonable timeframe. 8 With over-burdened federal, state and local
prison systems releasing approximately 630,000 prisoners each year, erro-
neous release and delayed incarceration of prisoners have become "sur-
prisingly widespread and recurring phenomenon[s]" in the American
criminal justice system.9
calculation system). In the case of RommelJones, the classification director admit-
ted that the calculation needed to be done by hand but "[t] he department missed
it." See id. (noting prison official's admission of negligence on part of
department).
4. See id. (discussing prison officials' efforts to remedy error and mitigate fur-
ther errors in calculating criminal sentences).
5. See id. (discussing results of Department of Corrections investigation that
identified other inmates held past their rightful sentences).
6. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Getting Out ofJail Free: Sentence Creditfor Periods of
Mistaken Liberty, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 403 (1996) (citing various cases of erroneous
release and delayed incarceration, and discussing remedies afforded to affected
prisoners).
7. SeeJay M. Zitter, Annotation, Effect of Delay in Taking Defendant into Custody
After Conviction and Sentence, 76 A.L.R. 5TH 485, 499 (2000) (noting public's general
assumption that government officials are diligent in incarcerating convicted
criminals and ensuring they remain in custody until their sentences expire).
8. See generally id. (collecting cases of mistaken release or delayed incarcera-
tion and comparing legal consequences across jurisdictions).
9. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 742 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting fre-
quency of erroneous release cases and arguing that executive actions effectuating
erroneous releases could not be considered arbitrary because of their frequency).
In Hawkins, the Fourth Circuit referred to an academic comment, supra note 6,
collecting over 100 such cases of erroneous release or delayed incarceration. See
id. (noting extent and persistence of erroneous releases and delayed incarcera-
tion). The court further speculated that the cases cited could only represent a
fraction of true occurrences because not all erroneous releases are actually re-
ported and litigated. See id. (drawing inferences to support argument that errone-
ous release cases do not necessarily involve arbitrary executive action). Based on
this analysis, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the erroneous release in Hawkins
was not so unique to raise any presumption of arbitrariness. See id. at 744 (con-
cluding that analysis of history and traditional practice did not suggest that govern-
ment's error was arbitrary "in the constitutional sense"). In addition to the Fourth
Circuit's analysis in Hawkins, official statistics produced by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons also suggest that erroneous release may be a frequent occurrence. See gen-
[Vol. 53: p. 385
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Federal and state courts differ on how to deal with such errors and
what remedy, if any, is available to prisoners who have spent time "errone-
ously at liberty," through no fault of their own. 1° The traditional rule re-
quired prisoners who spent time erroneously at liberty to serve out the
remainder of their sentences in their entirety regardless of the circum-
stances surrounding the erroneous release or delay.1 1 Because of the
traditional rule's harsh effects, many courts have formulated exceptions to
this rule.'
2
In its recent decision in Vega v. United States,13 the Third Circuit dis-
cussed two exceptions to the traditional rule.' 4 The first exception is
based on constitutional guarantees of due process. 15 The second excep-
tion is a judicially-derived doctrine that allows courts to grant credit for
time spent erroneously at liberty.1 6 Although the Third Circuit denied
Vega's due process claim, the court found a basis for Vega's request for
credit for time spent erroneously at liberty at common law. 17 In its opin-
ion, the court formally recognized the "doctrine of credit for time errone-
erally FED. BuREAu OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BuREAu 2005 8, http://www.bop.gov/
news/PDFs/sob05.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2008) (stating that "[m]ore inmates are
being released each year than were in the entire Federal prison system 20 years
ago"). According to its State of the Bureau Report, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
releases approximately 41,000 inmates per year, and all U.S. correctional systems
combined release upwards of 630,000. See id. (providing statistics and discussing
need for re-entry programs for released prisoners).
10. See generally Zitter, supra note 7 (comparing cases in which courts have
discussed whether, and under what circumstances, criminal sentences are deemed
to have run while prisoner is at liberty). Courts use the term "erroneously at lib-
erty" to describe situations in which a convicted criminal is not taken into custody
within a reasonable time following the pronouncement of a judgment or released
from custody despite not having served time still remaining. See, e.g., Green v.
Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting appellant credit to-
ward unexpired portion of sentence for time "at liberty following his erroneous
release"); Commonwealth v. Blair, 699 A.2d 738, 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (deny-
ing appellant credit for time "erroneously at liberty" due to delayed incarceration).
11. For a collection of case law and other legal authorities discussing the
traditional rule, see infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
12. See Chin, supra note 6, at 403-04 (discussing traditional common law rule
and doctrines used by courts to "alleviate [its] draconian effect"). For a further
discussion of two exceptions to the traditional common law rule, see infra notes 29-
66 and accompanying text.
13. 493 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
14. See id. at 315-18 (discussing due process implications in erroneous release
cases and common law doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty).
15. See id. at 317 (responding to appellant's claim that requiring him to re-
turn to prison after he was erroneously released and had begun rehabilitation pro-
cess would violate his due process rights).
16. See id. at 317-18 (recognizing common law doctrine of credit for time erro-
neously at liberty as sole basis upon which appellant may seek credit toward his
federal sentence). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis, see infra
notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
17. See id. at 313 ("The question of whether an erroneously released prisoner
is entitled to credit for time spent at liberty is one of first impression for this
Court.").
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ously at liberty," and derived a two-prong test for district courts to follow
when applying the doctrine.18
This Casenote argues that an erroneously released prisoner may have
a valid due process claim if his or her expectations regarding the finality of
a criminal sentence have "crystallized."1 9 Furthermore, this Casenote ar-
gues that in situations where a prisoner's expectations have not crystal-
lized, the Third Circuit's two-prong test for the doctrine of credit for time
at liberty may not adequately balance and protect the interests of the state,
the prisoner and society.20 Part II examines the two exceptions addressed
in Vega and details their varying interpretations across jurisdictions.2 1 Part
III provides a narrative analysis of the Third Circuit's decision in Vega.22
Part IV argues that reincarcerating an erroneously released prisoner may
violate the prisoner's due process rights if his or her expectations regard-
ing the finality of a criminal sentence have crystallized. 23 In addition, Part
V argues that in situations where the prisoner's expectations have not crys-
tallized, a totality of circumstances approach-rather than the Third Cir-
cuit's two-prong test-would be a more effective means of balancing the
18. See id. at 317 (declining to find due process violation but recognizing ap-
pellant may be entitled to credit under doctrine of credit for time at liberty).
Under the "doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty" or the "doctrine of
credit for time at liberty," a court may grant day-for-day jail time credit to a pris-
oner who has been erroneously released by government officials. See, e.g., Green v.
Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing doctrine of credit
for time at liberty and granting full day-for-day credit for time spent on erroneous
release). For a further discussion of the doctrine of credit for time erroneously at
liberty, see infra notes 44-73 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of case law and an analysis of American legal principles
implying that an erroneously released prisoner may have a viable claim of due
process, see infra notes 94-150 and accompanying text. The term "crystallize" or
"crystallization" is used by courts to describe the point at which it would be funda-
mentally unfair to frustrate a prisoner's expectations regarding the finality of the
prisoner's sentence. See, e.g., Breest v. Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1978)
(affirming trial court's increase of minimum sentence after defendant served four-
teen days). Crystallization usually requires either a significant passage of time after
the date of the prisoner's release, or the prisoner's expectations as to continued
freedom to acquire "some real and psychologically critical importance." See id.
(describing point at which it would be fundamentally unfair to alter sentence).
20. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's two-prong test and arguments advo-
cating a broader, totality of circumstances approach, see infra notes 151-71 and
accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of two exceptions to the traditional rule, the due process
exception and the doctrine of credit for time at liberty, and how courts have inter-
preted and applied these exceptions, see infra notes 29-66 and accompanying text.
22. For a synopsis of the factual and procedural background of the Vega case
as well as the Third Circuit's rationale, see infra notes 67-93 and accompanying
text.
23. For a discussion of courts that recognize prisoners' fundamental rights to
settled expectations regarding the finality of their sentences and an analysis of
legal principles stressing the importance of finality, see infra notes 106-50 and ac-
companying text.
[Vol. 53: p. 385
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competing interests at stake.24 Finally, Part VI urges the Third Circuit not
only to reconsider whether erroneously released prisoners have a funda-
mental interest in preserving their settled expectations of continued free-
dom, but also to expand its two-prong test to include more than just the
government's negligence and the prisoner's contributing fault.
2 5
II. THE "CAT" ALWAYS WINS: THE HARSH EFFECTS OF THE
TRADITIONAL RULE
The traditional rule required prisoners who were erroneously re-
leased and later reincarcerated to serve out their full sentence regardless
of the degree of government negligence, the amount of time lapsed since
the release or the prisoner's efforts to bring the mistake to the attention of
authorities. 26 Because of the harsh, unyielding effect of the traditional
rule, courts have recognized two exceptions to provide relief to a prisoner
who has spent time erroneously at liberty: the due process exception and
the doctrine of credit for time at liberty.27 These exceptions have proven
24. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit's two-prong test used to deter-
mine whether a prisoner is entitled to credit for time at liberty, see infra notes 151-
80 and accompanying text.
25. For arguments that the Third Circuit should both reconsider whether an
erroneously released prisoner could have a valid due process claim in certain cir-
cumstances and expand its two-prong test beyond consideration of the govern-
ment's negligence and the prisoner's contributing fault, see infra notes 94-171 and
accompanying text.
26. See United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1988) (recogniz-
ing traditional rule requiring erroneously released prisoners to serve full sentences
when error is discovered); United States ex rel. Mayer v. Loisel, 25 F.2d 300, 301
(5th Cir. 1928) (stating that mere lapse of time without imprisonment does not
constitute service of sentence); Leonard v. Rodda, 5 App. D.C. 256, 274-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1895) (requiring petitioner to serve full sentence although mistakenly re-
leased as result of inadvertence of warden and through no fault of his own);
United States v. Vann, 207 F. Supp 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that delay in
incarceration does not invalidate criminal sentence or affect its length because
term of imprisonment does not begin until defendant is taken into custody); Al-
dredge v. Potts, 200 S.E. 113, 114-15 (Ga. 1938) (holding that petitioner's sentence
was not tolled during periods of parole granted under void court orders); see also
Chin, supra note 6, at 403 (noting that many courts previously applied traditional
rule that required defendant to serve his or her full sentence regardless of circum-
stances surrounding release or delay). See generally Zitter, supra note 7 (comparing
cases in which various courts addressed whether, and under what circumstances,
delay in commencement or interruption of sentence should cause sentence to run
while prisoner is at liberty).
27. See Chin, supra note 6, at 403-04 (detailing two exceptions recognized by
courts to "alleviate the draconian effect of [the traditional rule]"). This Note ex-
amines two of the most common exceptions to the traditional common law rule
requiring an erroneously released prisoner to serve out his or her full sentence.
The first exception is based on a constitutional due process theory. See infra notes
29-43 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the due process theory
exception. The second exception is the doctrine of credit for time at liberty. See
infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the doctrine of
credit for time at liberty. In addition to these two exceptions, some courts will also
recognize an exception based on a theory of equitable estoppel. See Martinez, 837
2008] NOTE
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effective in granting relief to prisoners that would otherwise be unavaila-
ble under the traditional rule, but they have also created controversy over
when and how the exceptions should be applied.28
A. Due Process Lets the "Mouse" Go Free
The first exception, used to mitigate the harsh effects of the tradi-
tional rule, is based on the guarantees of due process found in the United
States Constitution. 29 Some courts, such as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,
F.2d at 865 (applying estoppel theory but declining to grant relief because, inter
alia, defendant was not ignorant of facts surrounding delay in execution of sen-
tence); Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying estop-
pel theory and finding government did not mislead defendant so that it would be
improper to charge defendant with constructive knowledge that defendant still
had time to serve); Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing government is estopped from reincarcerating defendant because he had been
led to believe, through eight successive administrative reviews, that defendant was
eligible for parole when released). The equitable estoppel theory states that the
government is estopped from reincarcerating the prisoner if: (1) the party to be
estopped knew the facts; (2) the party to be estopped intended that its conduct
would be acted upon or the party asserting estoppel has a right to believe it is so
intended; (3) the party asserting estoppel was ignorant of the facts; and (4) that
party relied on the former's conduct to its injury. See Green, 732 F.2d at 1399 (cit-
ing Johnson, 682 F.2d at 872) (listing four elements of equitable estoppel).
28. See Johnson, 682 F.2d at 873 (affirming district court's grant of habeas
corpus because reincarcerating prisoner who was mistakenly paroled would violate
due process); see also Green, 732 F.2d at 1400 (granting relief to erroneously re-
leased prisoner under doctrine of credit for time at liberty). See generally Zitter,
supra note 7 (compiling list of courts that have granted or denied relief to prison-
ers under either due process exception or doctrine of credit for time at liberty).
29. See Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1967) (finding state's
lack of interest in execution of defendant's sentence was equivalent to waiver of
jurisdiction and requiring defendant to complete sentence would violate his rights
under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment); see also 16C C.J.S. Constitu-
tional Law § 1670 (2007) (recognizing that state's attempt to reincarcerate prison-
ers after misleading them to believe they are free from prison sentences and then
making no attempt to reacquire custody for prolonged number of years would
violate due process). Due process of law is guaranteed by both the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 979 (2007) (discussing sources of constitutional right to due pro-
cess of law). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states "[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[,]" only applies to the federal government, and not to the states. U.S. CONST.
amend. V, cl. 4 (establishing constitutionally-protected right to due process of
law); see also 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 979 (2007) (distinguishing due pro-
cess clause of Fifth Amendment from identical clause in Fourteenth Amendment).
Nevertheless, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes this
limitation upon the states by providing "[n] o State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
(extending due process limitations to states). As stated by the Supreme Court in
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, due process aims to protect individuals from arbitrary
actions taken by the government that effectively deny an individual procedural
fairness or result in the government exerting power without any reasonable justifi-
cation. 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (internal citations omitted) (noting dual pur-
pose of due process in ensuring procedural and substantive fairness); see also
[Vol. 53: p. 385
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have held that delayed incarceration or reincarceration after an erroneous
release violates the prisoner's due process rights and requires the immedi-
ate release of the prisoner.3 0 Courts have analyzed due process claims
made by erroneously released prisoners under three different approaches:
(1) the "due process waiver theory"; (2) the balancing approach; and (3)
the two-part test established in County of Sacramento v. Lewis-'1 by the Su-
preme Court.3
2
Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 752 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan,J., dissenting)
("Although a literal reading of the Clause may suggest that the government only
has to afford its citizens a fair process, the Clause has been understood to contain a
substantive component as well, 'barring certain government actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 833)); see also Timothy P. Lydon, Note, If the Parole Board Blunders, Does the Four-
teenth Amendment Set the Prisoner Free? Balancing the Liberty Interests of Erroneously Re-
leased Prisoners, 88 GEO. LJ. 565, 573 (2000) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment
provides two categories of protections: procedural due process, which guarantees
that a state may not deprive individual of life, liberty or property without providing
procedural safeguards, and substantive due process which prohibits certain state
actions regardless of fairness of procedures). Therefore, due process requires that
actions by government officials must be consistent with the "fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice." See Shields, 370 F.2d at 1004 (establishing scope of due
process protection).
30. See Johnson, 682 F.2d at 873 (concluding reincarceration of prisoner after
mistakenly discharged on parole would be inconsistent with fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice and consequently violate due process); Shelton v. Cic-
cone, 578 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1978) (remanding case upon finding
defendant's allegations-that government knew of his whereabouts but either pur-
posely or out of extreme negligence failed to execute his sentence for seven
years-sufficient to suggest defendant had been denied due process); Piper v. Es-
telle, 485 F.2d 245, 246 (5th Cir. 1973) (recognizing reincarceration of defendant
upon showing of affirmative wrongdoing or gross negligence on part of state
would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice but deny-
ing relief based on facts of case); Shields, 370 F.2d at 1006 (holding reincarceration
of defendant after lapse of twenty-eight years would be inconsistent with funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice and violate due process); see also Bonebrake
v. Norris, 417 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying due process claim because
four-year delay in executing sentence was not conscience-shocking).
31. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
32. See Lydon, supra note 29, at 581 (discussing and assessing approaches to
substantive due process analysis in erroneous release cases). Lydon discusses three
approaches to substantive due process analysis and argues that the balancing ap-
proach, as opposed to the due process waiver theory or the Lewis analysis, is the
most effective test for erroneous release cases. See id. at 603 ("To prevent funda-
mentally unfair results, courts should balance the competing interests of the state
and erroneously released prisoners."). Lydon first discusses the "due process
waiver theory," which allows courts to discharge the unserved portion of an errone-
ously released prisoner's sentence if the government expressly or impliedly waives
jurisdiction over the prisoner. See id. at 581-82 (noting concept of waiver evolved
from Shields case and applies in situations where state's conduct is affirmatively
wrong or grossly negligent and prisoner has experienced prolonged period of free-
dom). For a further discussion of the due process waiver theory, see infra notes 33-
34 and accompanying text. Lydon also discusses the balancing approach, which
requires courts to weigh the interests of the prisoner in continued freedom against
the interests of the state in reincarcerating the prisoner. See id. at 573-74, 583-84
(summarizing use of balancing approach in general substantive due process chal-
2008] NOTE
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Under the due process waiver theory, a court may declare that the
government's conduct, in either delaying the commencement of a crimi-
nal sentence or allowing an erroneous release, operates as a waiver ofjuris-
diction over that prisoner.3 3  Because the government has waived
jurisdiction, reincarcerating the prisoner would violate his or her due pro-
cess rights. 34 In addition, courts have also used a balancing approach in
substantive due process challenges. 35 Under the balancing test, a court
may discharge a prisoner's remaining sentence if the prisoner's interest in
remaining free outweighs the government's penal interests.
36
lenges and tailoring this approach to erroneous release cases). For a further dis-
cussion of the balancing approach to substantive due process analysis, see infra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text. Lastly, Lydon discusses the Lewis test, which
requires a showing of conscience-shocking conduct on the part of the government
that infringes upon a fundamental right. See id. at 575-78, 586-94 (explaining Lewis
test and applying to erroneous release cases). For a further discussion of the Lewis
test, see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
33. See Shelton, 578 F.2d at 1244 (remanding for evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine if government's conduct in failing to execute judgment and commitment of
appellant for seven years was so arbitrary as to constitute waiver ofjurisdiction and
denial of due process); Piper, 485 F.2d at 246 (noting that state waiver theory re-
quires state action that is so affirmatively wrong or inaction that is so grossly negli-
gent that reincarceration would be inconsistent with "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice"); Shields, 370 F.2d at 1005-06 (holding erroneous release and
failure to reincarcerate for more than twenty-eight years operated as pardon of
sentence and waiver ofjurisdiction; surrendering sovereign lacked authority to de-
mand completion of prior sentence and denied prisoner due process rights); see
also Bonebrake, 417 F.3d at 941 (applying waiver theory but declining to grant de-
fendant's writ of habeas corpus because government's behavior was not so egre-
gious nor was its inaction so grossly negligent that it would be inconsistent with
fundamental principles of liberty and justice).
34. See Shelton, 578 F.2d at 1246 (stating that whether appellant's due process
rights have been violated depends on whether government's failure to apprehend
appellant is sufficient to establish that government has waived jurisdiction over
appellant); Piper, 485 F.2d at 246 (acknowledging that Shields waiver theory is based
upon due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Shields, 370 F.2d at 1006
(holding that state denied appellant due process because state lacked authority to
execute sentence after waiving jurisdiction); see also Chin, supra note 6, at 418 (not-
ing that waiver theory "relies on the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
35. See Lydon, supra note 29, at 573-74, 583-86 (explaining balancing ap-
proach used by some courts in substantive due process challenges).
36. See id. (indicating that state cannot burden individual's liberty interest if it
outweighs state's interests). Lydon argues that the balancing approach is the most
effective means of prohibiting states from reincarcerating rehabilitated individuals
who no longer pose a threat to society. See id. (advocating balancing approach
over waiver theory or Lewis test). Lydon implies that this approach would not pro-
vide a windfall to erroneously released prisoners because states have substantial
interests in deterrence, punishment and public safety. See id. (noting that state's
penal interests will frequently outweigh prisoner's liberty interest). According to
Lydon, this approach is more appropriate because it provides relief in compelling
cases where the prisoner has been free for a significant period of time and made
significant progress in rehabilitation. See id. (emphasizing benefits of balancing
approach).
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In more recent cases involving substantive due process challenges,
courts have used the two-part Lewis test.37 Under this approach, the pris-
oner first must show that the government's conduct in reincarcerating the
prisoner, after a period of erroneous release, "shock[s] the contemporary
conscience. " 38 Second, the prisoner must show that the conduct violates a
37. See Bonebrake, 417 F.3d at 942-43 (applying Lewis test to determine whether
state's four-year delay in seeking to execute sentence violated substantive due pro-
cess); Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 738-46 (4th Cir. 1999) (using Lewis test to
determine whether reincarcerating appellant after he was mistakenly released on
parole would violate due process).
38. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 & n.8 (1998) (stating
only most egregious, conscience-shocking official conduct could bring out substan-
tive due process violation). When the waiver theory was first articulated by the
Fifth Circuit in Shields, a showing of prolonged inaction or lack of interest on the
part of the government sufficed to establish a due process violation. See Shields, 370
F.2d at 1006 (finding government's failure to file detainer and lack of interest in
appellant for more than twenty-eight years sufficient to operate as waiver of juris-
diction over appellant). This standard was later refined when the Fifth Circuit
stated that a "lack of eager pursuit" by the government was not enough. See Piper,
485 F.2d at 246 (distinguishing Shields and denying claim that conduct by state
constituted waiver of jurisdiction). Instead, the court required proof of conduct
on the part of the government "so affirmatively wrong or ... inaction so grossly
negligent that it would be unequivocally inconsistent with fundamental principles
of liberty and justice to require a legal sentence to be served in the aftermath of
such action or inaction." Id. at 246 (explaining kind of government conduct that
would violate substantive due process) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Shelton, 578 F.2d at 1244 (finding that, under Piper, holding government's choice
to hold judgment and commitment papers on appellant for seven years before
executing sentence would constitute gross negligence or arbitrary exercise of
power). In more recent cases, courts have relied on the Supreme Court's directive
in Lewis stating that only governmental conduct that "shock[s] the conscience" will
suffice to establish a violation of due process. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (estab-
lishing requisite standard of governmental conduct in substantive due process
claims); see also Bonebrake, 417 F.3d at 942 (applying Lewis standard and finding
state's four-year delay in executing sentence did not meet this rigorous standard);
Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 746 (applying Lewis standard and holding reincarcerating
appellant who had been mistakenly released on parole would not shock contempo-
rary conscience because delay of four years was not overly excessive and there was
no evidence that government purposely failed to execute sentence or was grossly
negligent in that regard). In his concurring opinion in Lewis, Justice Scalia re-
jected the shocks-the-conscience test comparing this standard to the highly subjec-
tive substantive due process methodologies that were previously rejected by the
Court. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting test derived by
majority because it closely resembled analysis disfavored by Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). Justice Scalia claimed that instead of asking
whether the particular activity shocks the conscience, the inquiry should be
whether the rights asserted by the individual have traditionally been protected. See
id. at 863 (same). Although Justice Souter's majority opinion admitted that the
shocks-the-conscience test is "no calibrated yard stick," he denied the similarities,
perceived by Justice Scalia, between this standard and those rejected in Glucksberg.
See id. at 847 (rebutting Justice Scalia's argument in concurrence). Justice Souter
insisted that the threshold question should be whether the executive action shocks
the contemporary conscience, otherwise the Constitution would be "demoted to
... a font of tort law." See id. at 847 n.8 (same). Only after the executive action is
established as conscience-shocking will the court consider any historical, textual or
controlling precedent for the alleged due process violation. See id. (establishing
2008] NOTE
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fundamental right or liberty that is implicit in the prisoner's right to due
process.39 A substantive due process claim will only be upheld if the pris-
oner establishes both requirements. 40
Courts often disagree over whether an erroneously released pris-
oner's liberty interest is fundamental and thus subject to due process pro-
tection. 41 Some courts will recognize a prisoner's due process claim
second step in substantive due process analysis). To clarify what kind of govern-
ment action would shock the conscience, the Supreme Court emphasized in Lewis
that the Constitution does not guarantee a standard of due care and, therefore,
negligence on the part of state officials will not be sufficient to cross the threshold
of constitutional due process. See id. at 848 (establishing standard of conduct re-
quired for substantive due process challenge). Instead, the Court implied con-
science-shocking conduct would most likely be intentional actions that are
unjustifiable by any legitimate government interest. See id. (same). Compare
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding that forced pumping of
suspect's stomach violated due process rights because such conduct "shock[ed]
the conscience" and violated "decencies of civilized conduct"), with Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 130 (1992) (holding city's alleged failure to train its
employees regarding workplace hazards was not arbitrary or conscience-shocking
in constitutional sense).
39. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (announcing that only after showing that
conduct is sufficiently egregious will court need to determine whether asserted
right warrants due process protection). In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. See Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720-21 (holding that asserted right to assistance in committing suicide was
not fundamental liberty interest protected by due process clause). The Court
noted that, in addition to those freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights, protec-
tion has been extended to other liberties including the right to marry; to have
children; to direct the education and upbringing of one's children; to marital pri-
vacy; to use contraception; to bodily integrity; and to abortion. See id. at 720 (list-
ing fundamental rights). Nonetheless, the Court emphasized its reluctance to
expand substantive due process rights and the need to "'exercise the utmost care
whenever... break [ing] new ground in this field."' Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S.
at 125) (disfavoring expansion of due process rights). The Court suggested that
among the rights protected are those "fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' Id. at 720-21
(quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion))
(describing fundamental right). The Court further explained due process protec-
tion extends to those rights that are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
such that 'neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" Id. (quot-
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)) (establishing requisite
showing in substantive due process challenge to legislative action). In addition to
a showing of the fundamental nature of the asserted liberty interest, the Court also
required a "careful description" of this interest. See id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at
125) (qualifying requisite showing in substantive due process challenge to legisla-
tive action).
40. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 738 (stating that conscience-shocking standard is
threshold test of culpability; if conduct does not meet this test, then due process
claim fails; if conduct does meet this test, then court must determine what level of
protection is afforded to liberty interest in question); see also Lydon, supra note 29,
at 575-77 (noting first step of Lewis test requires conscience-shocking conduct and
second step requires court to determine if liberty interest at issue is fundamental).
41. CompareJohnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
that reincarcerating petitioner after period of erroneous release on parole would
violate due process), and Sanchez v. Warden, 329 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206 (D.N.H.
394 [Vol. 53: p. 385
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where the prisoner's expectations regarding the finality of his sentence
and his continued freedom have crystallized. 42 On the contrary, other
courts have rejected due process claims under similar circumstances, argu-
ing that the prisoner's asserted liberty interest was not constitutionally
protected. 4
3
B. Giving the Mouse Some Cheese: The Doctrine of Credit for Time Erroneously
at Liberty
In addition to the due process exception to the traditional rule, a
majority of courts will provide relief to a prisoner via the doctrine of credit
for time spent erroneously at liberty.44 Under this doctrine, courts may
grant credit equal to the time spent at liberty toward the prisoner's out-
standing sentence. 45 Unlike the due process exception, the doctrine of
2004) (recognizing that denial of credit for time at liberty that would affect dura-
tion of prisoner's confinement and require him to serve sentence in installments
may implicate due process protection), with Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 74248 (asserting
that erroneous release is too common to be considered conscience-shocking and
declaring that right of erroneously released prisoner to continued freedom is not
fundamental).
42. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 756 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) ("Fourth Circuit
law provides that after an inmate is released on parole, his reasonable expectation
of continued freedom crystallizes over time. Once crystallized, that reasonable ex-
pectation of freedom is a legitimate liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause."); United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294, 1298 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) (rec-
ognizing that increasing sentence may violate due process if prisoner's expecta-
tions regarding its finality have crystallized); United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118,
123 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir.
1989) (same); United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1985) (same);
United States v. Campbell, 985 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); United
States v. Tolson, 935 F. Supp. 17, 21 (D.D.C. 1996) (same); Thayer v. United States,
937 F. Supp. 662, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same); Santiago v. United States, 954 F.
Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (same); United States v. Crowder, 947 F. Supp.
1183, 1193 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (same); see also DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 34-
35 (1st Cir. 1993) (asserting that due process imposes some outer limits on power
to increase sentences, but recognizing that only in extreme cases will correction to
earlier sentence be deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness).
43. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 750 (holding that "precise liberty interest asserted
here-that of continuing in a state of freedom erroneously granted by government
. . .- cannot be found one of those fundamental rights and liberties which are
objectively deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition") (internal quota-
tions omitted).
44. For a discussion of courts that have adopted the doctrine of credit for
time erroneously at liberty, see infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
45. See United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1988) (recogniz-
ing doctrine of credit for time at liberty but finding appellant's claim under doc-
trine to be premature because he had not exhausted administrative remedies);
Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing doctrine
of credit for time at liberty and granting full day-for-day credit for time spent on
erroneous release); see also 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2179 (2007) ("[W]hen a pris-
oner is released or discharged from prison by mistake, his or her sentence contin-
ues to run while he or she is at liberty and his or her sentence must be credited
with that time .... ").
11
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credit for time erroneously at liberty does not completely discharge the
remaining criminal sentence, but instead reduces the prisoner's remain-
ing sentence.
4 6
The doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty was first intro-
duced by the Tenth Circuit in White v. Pearlman.47 In White, the Tenth
Circuit emphasized that a prisoner has certain rights, including the right
to serve a continuous sentence free from interruptions.48 The court con-
cluded that where a prisoner is mistakenly released from a penal institu-
tion, through no fault of the prisoner and without violation of parole, the
sentence continues to run while the prisoner is at liberty.49 Because the
46. Compare United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 808-09 (D.D.C. 1979)
(vacating remainder of defendant's federal sentence because reincarceration of
defendant would violate fundamental principles of liberty and justice), with Green,
732 F.2d at 1400 (remanding to district court for order requiring prison authori-
ties to grant day-for-day credit for time spent erroneously at liberty and to recalcu-
late release date accordingly).
47. 42 F.2d 788, 788 (10th Cir. 1930) (establishing rule against installment
punishment and holding that erroneously released prisoner's sentence continues
to run while at liberty). In White, the petitioner was granted a writ of habeas
corpus after he was erroneously released by the warden of the Texas state peniten-
tiary prior to the expiration of his sentence and then ordered to serve the remain-
der of his sentence after two years at liberty. See id. (detailing events leading to
Tenth Circuit's review). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the government's power to
recommit a prisoner who has been mistakenly released, but also recognized a pris-
oner's right to a continuous sentence. See id. (establishing rights of government
and prisoner in cases of erroneous release). The court concluded that "where a
prisoner is discharged from a penal institution, without any contributing fault on
his part, and without violation of conditions of parole, that his sentence continues
to run while he is at liberty." Id. (same). The Tenth Circuit's holding in White has
since been adopted by a number of courts and gradually evolved into what is now
referred to as the doctrine of credit for time at liberty. See Vega v. United States,
493 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating origin of doctrine of credit for time at
liberty can be traced to Tenth Circuit's holding in White); Green, 732 F.2d at 1400
(noting that underlying principle entitling prisoners to credit for time erroneously
at liberty was first set forth in White); United States v. Mazzoni, 677 F. Supp. 339,
341 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating principle that prisoner's sentence continues to run
while at liberty was first enunciated in White).
48. See White 42 F.2d at 789 (establishing rule against installment punishment
and holding that erroneously released prisoner's sentence continues to run while
at liberty). In White, the court states that a prisoner has a right to a continuous
sentence because the prisoner should be able to serve a timely sentence and re-
establish him or herself in society. See id. (providing rationale for rule against in-
stallment punishment). The court explains that if the government is allowed to
enforce service of a criminal sentence in installments, the prisoner will not have a
chance to "live down his past." See id. (same).
49. See id. (establishing rule that sentence continues to run while prisoner is
erroneously at liberty but limiting to situations where prisoner is not at fault). The
White court effectively rejected the traditional common law rule by stating that a
prisoner's sentence continues to run while at liberty. See id. (holding that sentence
continues to run grants credit for time spent at liberty contrary to traditional rule
which required prisoner to serve full sentence). The court clearly stated, however,
that the rule should not apply to a prisoner who escaped from prison or violated
conditions of parole. See id. (stating that "escaped prisoner cannot be credited
with the time he is at large"). While the Tenth Circuit made clear that this rule
[Vol. 53: p. 385
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prisoner's sentence continues to run while he or she is not in custody, the
Tenth Circuit's rule grants day-for-day credit for time spent at liberty.
50
Since its inception in White, the doctrine of credit for time errone-
ously at liberty has been adopted by a majority of circuits. 5 1 In addition,
should only be available to prisoners without any contributing fault, the court de-
clined to consider whether a prisoner who is cognizant of the mistake has an af-
firmative duty to ensure his or her sentence is fully executed. See id. ("As to
whether a prisoner, who knows a mistake is being made and says nothing, is at
fault, we do not now consider.").
50. See id. (establishing rule that sentence continues to run after mistaken
release and effectively granting credit for time spent at liberty). The defendant in
White was reincarcerated after being mistakenly discharged. See id. (recounting
events leading up to prisoner's filing of habeas petition and court's grant of relief).
Shortly after the date on which his original sentence would have expired had he
not been released, the defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus. See id.
(same). The district court granted the writ and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. See id.
(detailing procedural history and court's holding).
51. See, e.g., Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 2007) (formulat-
ing test to determine when credit for time at liberty should be awarded and re-
manding case to district court for further consideration consistent with this test);
Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging credit may
be granted to erroneously released prisoners under certain circumstances but de-
nying defendant credit because delay in commencement of service does not consti-
tute service of that sentence); Thompson v. Cockrell, 263 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir.
2001) (stating defendant has right to continuous sentence and is entitled to credit
for time spent erroneously at liberty as long as defendant was not at fault); Clark v.
Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting credit for time spent at liberty
following erroneous release); Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir.
1994) (recognizing common law rule against service of sentence in installments
but denying credit on facts); United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating doctrine of credit for time at liberty would apply to defendant's case
but claim for credit was premature because defendant had not exhausted adminis-
trative remedies); Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
failure of marshals to take custody of defendant did not prevent his sentence from
running while he was at liberty); Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1984) (granting credit for time spent at liberty based on doctrine set forth in
White and adopted by Ninth Circuit in Smith); Cox v. United States ex rel. Arron,
551 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1977) (recognizing doctrine of credit for time at
liberty but denying credit based on circumstances of case); United States v. Dow-
ney, 469 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 1972) (stating criminal sentence runs from date
on which defendant is taken into custody and granting defendant credit for time
spent in state custody prior to commencement of federal sentence); United States
v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1971) (concluding defendant's sentence ran
from date of federal court's order of commitment even though defendant first
held in county jail and later delivered to state prison); United States ex rel. Binion
v. O'Brien, 273 F.2d 495, 498 (3d Cir. 1959) (granting defendant credit against
criminal sentence for time required to report to probation officer after probation
had expired); Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1937) (reversing denial of
writ because prisoner entitled to serve time promptly and deemed to be serving it
from date ordered and taken into custody); United States v. Nickens, 856 F. Supp.
72, 73 (D.P.R. 1994) (recognizing doctrine of credit for time at liberty as adopted
by Ninth Circuit), vacated pursuant to settlement, No. 94-1861, 1995 WL 314483 (1st
Cir. Apr. 14, 1995) (granting credit upon joint motion for disposition of appeal).
In Nickens, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico recognized the
common law doctrine of credit for time at liberty but declined to award credit
because the defendant failed to show that the government was negligent. See id. at
13
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many state courts have also adopted the doctrine. 52 Despite the broad
acceptance of the doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty, courts
recognizing the doctrine disagree on the factors that should be consid-
ered when granting credit towards a criminal sentence. 53
One issue that courts disagree over is whether a prisoner should re-
ceive credit only when there is an interruption of a sentence, and not
merely a delay in its commencement. 54 Some courts, such as the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, have argued that the doctrine of credit for time errone-
ously at liberty only applies in situations where the prisoner was errone-
ously released after serving some portion of the original sentence. 5
5
Other courts, including the Second and Seventh Circuits, state that a pris-
oner can be afforded credit under the doctrine regardless of whether the
prisoner's sentence actually began. 56 As suggested by one commentator,
the key to the doctrine of credit for time at liberty is disobedience of a
court order, not interruption of a criminal sentence. 57 For instance, when
74 (denying credit on facts). This holding was later vacated by the First Circuit
and the case was remanded to the district court to award credit against the defen-
dant's sentence as originally requested. See United States v. Nickens, No. 94-1861,
1995 WL 314483 (1st Cir. Apr. 14, 1995) (granting credit upon joint motion for
disposition of appeal).
52. See Chin, supra note 6, at 408-10 nn.25-44 (collecting cases from state
courts in District of Columbia, Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Lou-
isiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, California, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire and Ohio that have
recognized doctrine of credit for time at liberty). Chin also cites to cases in which
the United States Department of Justice and authorities in Delaware, Nevada and
Wisconsin granted credit without litigation in support of the proposition that the
doctrine of credit for time at liberty is widely accepted. See id. at 410 nn.45-48
(collecting cases in which prosecutors have recognized doctrine and granted
credit without contention).
53. For a further discussion of the varying interpretations of the doctrine of
credit for time at liberty and the factors over which different jurisdictions are split,
see infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
54. See Chin, supra note 6, at 420-28 (discussing whether doctrine of credit for
time erroneously at liberty should apply only to interruptions of sentences).
55. See Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2004) (asserting delay
in commencement of sentence does not constitute service of that sentence);
United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying on Smith and
White to support proposition that doctrine of credit for time at liberty has only
been applied in cases where convicted person has served some part of sentence
and then been erroneously released).
56. See Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "gov-
ernment is not permitted to delay the expiration of the sentence either by post-
poning the commencement of the sentence or by releasing the prisoner for a time
and then reimprisoning him"); Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding federal sentence began to run on date ordered even though appellant was
never taken into custody).
57. See Chin, supra note 6, at 421 (asserting that doctrine has typically been
triggered when court order is ignored regardless of whether prisoner has begun
service of sentence). Chin argues that the doctrine of credit for time erroneously
at liberty applies to interruptions of sentences as well as delays in the commence-
ment of a sentence. See id. (acknowledging circuit split over issue and arguing that
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a court imposes a sentence that is meant to run concurrent to an existing
sentence but the marshal fails to execute the court order, the doctrine
prevents the prisoner from serving consecutive state and federal time. 58
As such, the doctrine of credit for time at liberty provides a means for
effectuating the court's original intent, even though a sentence has not
technically been interrupted.
59
A second area of disagreement is whether a finding of negligence on
the part of the imprisoning sovereign is required to grant credit toward a
prisoner's outstanding sentence. 60 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, will
grant credit upon a showing of negligence by any government entity, not
just the imprisoning sovereign. 6 1 Although circuits disagree over which
party must be negligent, the circuits generally agree that a showing of sim-
ple or mere negligence will entitle a prisoner to credit.6 2
doctrine can apply regardless of whether sentence was interrupted or never be-
gan). Chin criticizes the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Smith and White, and
argues that these cases do not support the conclusion that credit can only be af-
forded when a sentence is interrupted. See id. (noting that defendant in Smith had
not begun service of sentence and both Smith and White relied on In reJennings, 118
F. 479 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1902), in which defendant had not begun service of sen-
tence). Chin also refutes the argument that Title 18 Section 3585(a) of the United
States Code prohibits the doctrine from applying where the defendant has not
begun service of the sentence before being erroneously released. See id. at 423-28
(asserting that granting credit to prisoner who has not starting serving sentence is
not inconsistent with language or purpose of Code). According to this section of
the Code, "[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody, awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily
to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2000). As Chin points out, the
United States Department ofJustice has suggested that this statute should be inter-
preted liberally and, therefore, a majority of courts have held that the federal stat-
ute is not a bar to credit even when a sentence never began because a defendant
was erroneously at liberty. See Chin, supra note 6, at 424 (arguing doctrine of
credit for time at liberty does not only apply when sentence has been interrupted).
58. See Chin, supra note 6, at 422 (providing rationale for assertion that doc-
trine of credit for time erroneously at liberty applies to delayed incarcerations in
addition to erroneous releases).
59. See id. (outlining application of doctrine of credit for time erroneously at
liberty).
60. See Leggett, 380 F.3d at 235-36 (stating prisoner should not receive credit
for time at liberty when erroneous release was mistake of independent sovereign).
61. See Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding negligence
on part of any government entity is sufficient to grant credit for time erroneously
at liberty).
62. See id. at 374 (requiring only showing of simple or mere negligence);
United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1988) (asserting that defen-
dant released on bond pending appeal can receive credit based solely on theory of
simple or mere negligence); Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir.
1984) (granting defendant full credit for time at liberty upon showing of mere
negligence). But see United States v. Nickens, 856 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D.P.R. 1994)
(stating that action based on mere or simple negligence may not be recognized in
First Circuit but failing to suggest what level of negligence is required), vacated
pursuant to settlement, No. 94-1861, 1995 WL 314483 (D.P.R. April 14, 1995) (grant-
ing credit upon joint motion for disposition of appeal).
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Lastly, courts disagree about whether an erroneously released pris-
oner has an affirmative duty to ensure service of the full sentence. 6 3 Al-
though the Tenth Circuit stated in White that prisoners will only be
entitled to credit if they were released through no fault of their own, the
court did not address whether prisoners have an affirmative duty to bring
mistakes to the attention of authorities.64 Consequently, courts that have
adopted the doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty have taken
different stances on this issue. 65 In Vega, the Third Circuit addressed the
issue regarding a prisoner's responsibility as well as many other relevant
issues that have created a decisive circuit split.
6 6
III. VEGA V. UNITED STATES: THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES THE ROLE OF
REFEREE IN A GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE
A. Prisoner is Set Free... By Mistake
The principal issue before the Third Circuit in Vega was whether the
appellant was entitled to credit toward his federal sentence for the time he
spent at liberty after being erroneously released from state prison. 67 On
63. See Chin, supra note 6, at 414 (recognizing that federal case law implies
that prisoner is still entitled to credit even if prisoner was aware of mistake and
remained silent, but pointing out that some state courts have declined credit
under similar circumstances).
64. See White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) (stating "[a]s to
whether a prisoner, who knows a mistake is being made and says nothing, is at
fault, we do not now consider").
65. Compare Martinez, 837 F.2d at 866 (asserting defendant "has no affirmative
duty to aid in execution of his sentence"), with Nickens, 856 F. Supp. at 76 (con-
cluding defendant had affirmative duty under original judgment and sentence to
stay in contact with officials and to arrange for surrender), and Brown v. Brittain,
773 P.2d 570, 574-75 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (stating that where prisoner is re-
leased through no fault of his own but remains silent regarding mistake, court
should put more weight on his conduct while at liberty).
66. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis and holding in Vega, see
infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
67. See 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing issues addressed on ap-
peal). In addition to requesting credit for time spent erroneously at liberty, the
appellant also requested credit for the time he was in the custody of state officials
prior to his transfer into federal custody pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus ad
prosquendum. See id. (recounting facts relevant to question of whether appellant
was entitled to credit for time served in state custody). At trial, the district court
declined to award credit for this time period. See id. (providing procedural history
regarding question of whether appellant was entitled to credit for time served in
state custody). In its opinion, the district court determined that appellant had
received full credit on his federal sentence for the time he spent in state custody
after being charged with federal offenses but before he was sentenced. See id. (pro-
viding rationale for district court's finding that appellant was not entitled to credit
for time spent in state custody). The appellant, therefore, still had sixty-seven
months and twenty-eight days left to serve and was not entitled to any further
credit. See id. (detailing amount of credit appellant deserved). On appeal, the
appellant argued that because he was a Category Three parole violator his sen-
tence should have been calculated as the time spent in custody on the parole viola-
tion warrant plus three months. See id. (summarizing appellant's argument on
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August 27, 1998, New York state authorities arrested Vega and charged
him with drug possession, assault and violation of his state parole. 68
Approximately one year later, Vega was charged with federal offenses
based upon the same conduct which gave rise to the state charges.
69
Vega pled guilty and was sentenced to ninety-six months in federal
prison.
7 0
appeal). In response, the Government argued that this time period had already
been credited towards the appellant's state parole violation sentence of 1,261 days
and could not also be credited towards the appellant's federal sentence. See id.
(denying appellant's request on appeal for credit for time served). The Third Cir-
cuit denied the appellant's claim on this issue because of the lack of evidence
suggesting that the appellant qualified as a Category Three violator. See id. (pro-
viding rationale for denying credit for time served in state custody). Furthermore,
the Third Circuit found the Bureau of Prisons had correctly credited this time to
the appellant's state parole violation and no further credit was due to the appel-
lant. See id. (specifying amount of credit appellant deserved). In conclusion, the
Third Circuit found the district court's denial of credit against the appellant's fed-
eral sentence was not clearly erroneous. See id. (affirming district court's holding).
68. See id. at 313 (detailing charges leading to appellant's conviction by state
authorities). On August 1, 2001, the State dismissed all of its charges, except for
the parole violation. See id. (recounting events leading up to appellant's erroneous
release). The appellant's parole was later revoked on February 8, 2002, and he
received a forty-four month sentence in state prison. See id. (outlining appellant's
parole terms).
69. See id. (detailing basis for appellant's federal conviction). The appellant
was transferred from state to federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum. See id. (describing procedural means used by federal authorities
to charge and convict appellant while he was in state custody). Habeas corpus ad
prosequendum is Latin for "that you have the body to prosecute." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is used
in criminal cases to bring before a court a prisoner to be tried on charges other
than those for which the prisoner is currently being confined. See id.; see also 39
AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies § 1 (2007) (summarizing and
defining various types of habeas corpus petitions). When state authorities are first
to arrest a criminal defendant, the state takes primary jurisdiction over the defen-
dant for trial, sentencing and incarceration. See Erin E. Goffette, Note, Sovereignty
in Sentencing: Concurrent and Consecutive Sentencing of a Defendant Subject to Simultane-
ous State and FederalJurisdiction, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 1035, 1055-56 (2003) (discussing
procedural rules regarding sequence of custody and order in which sentences are
served when single defendant is charged in multiple jurisdictions). Federal au-
thorities may "borrow" the defendant for prosecution on federal offenses pursuant
to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum but they may not interfere with a state
sentence. See id. (describing federal court procedure for defendant serving state
sentence). If the defendant is convicted on the federal offenses, the defendant is
returned to state custody to serve the state sentence first. See id. (outlining incar-
ceration procedure for defendant serving concurrent federal and state sentences).
If the federal sentence is to be served consecutively, the defendant will begin to
serve the federal sentence only after completion of the state sentence and release
of the defendant pursuant to the federal detainer lodged by the U.S. Marshal. See
id. at 1056-57 (detailing procedure for defendant serving consecutive state and
federal sentences).
70. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 313 (describing procedural means used to ensure
appellant would be remitted to federal authorities when state sentence had ex-
pired). The Marshals Service never received confirmation that state authorities
17
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After Vega's federal conviction, the U.S. Marshals Service lodged a
federal detainer advising the state warden to notify the marshal when Vega
completed his state sentence. 7 1 Despite its request, Vega was released
from state prison instead of being transferred directly to federal custody. 72
Approximately two years after his release, federal authorities arrested Vega
and ordered him to complete his outstanding federal sentence.
73
In response, Vega filed a petition for habeas corpus requesting credit
for the time he spent erroneously at liberty after being released from state
prison.7 4 The district court denied credit toward Vega's federal sentence
had received and would honor the detainer. See id. (implying that facts were un-
clear as to whether state authorities received federal detainer).
71. See id. (detailing appellant's erroneous release from state custody).
72. See id. (detailing appellant's rearrest by federal authorities after he was
erroneously released from state custody).
73. See id. (stating basis for appellant's initial claim and subsequent appeal).
74. See id. (discussing district court's finding in initial habeas proceeding). A
writ of habeas corpus, also referred to as habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, is em-
ployed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party's
imprisonment or detention is not illegal. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed.
2004); see also 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies § 1 (2007)
(summarizing and defining various types of habeas corpus petitions). The pur-
pose of this writ is not to determine the guilt or innocence of a prisoner, but
instead to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held. See
id. (describing purpose of each type of habeas corpus petition). This procedural
device, therefore, safeguards individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action and subjects executive, judicial or private restraints on liberty to judicial
scrutiny. See id. (same). See generally Maureen A. Dowd, Note, A Comparison of Sec-
tion 1983 and Federal Habeas Corpus in State Prisoners' Litigation, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1315, 1319-25 (1984) (discussing development and uses of federal habeas
corpus). Title 28 Section 2241 of the United States Code grants courts the power
to issue writs. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). The applicable section of the Code states:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their re-
spective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the
records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint com-
plained of is had.
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may
decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may
transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district
court having jurisdiction to entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or trea-
ties of the United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, author-
ity, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission,
order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity
and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss2/4
20081 NOTE 403
because his release resulted from the error of a separate sovereign, not the
imprisoning sovereign.7 5 Vega appealed the district court's decision chal-
lenging the calculation of his sentence and the denial of credit toward his
federal sentence. 7 6 On appeal, the Third Circuit denied Vega's due pro-
cess claim but upheld his request for credit under the doctrine of credit
for time erroneously at liberty. 77 Accordingly, the Third Circuit formu-
lated a two-prong test to determine whether Vega was entitled to relief
under the doctrine, but found it necessary to remand the case to the dis-
trict court for further consideration.
78
B. Giving the Cat the Advantage: The Third Circuit Denies Vega's Due Process
Claim and Limits the Doctrine of Credit for Time at Liberty
The Third Circuit began its analysis by stating that the doctrine of
credit for time at liberty does not have a constitutional basis and, there-
fore, denying credit would not violate Vega's due process rights. 79 In its
opinion, the Third Circuit referred to the Lewis case, in which the Su-
preme Court stated that "in a due process challenge to executive action,
the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental of-
ficer ... [would] shock the contemporary conscience."8 0 Moreover, the
Third Circuit emphasized that the government's conduct must also in-
fringe upon one of the "fundamental rights ... implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" to invoke due process protection.8 1 The Third Circuit
Id. (establishing prisoner's right to petition for writ of habeas corpus and outlining
requirements necessary to invoke this right).
75. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 313 (stating district court's basis for denying appel-
lant credit for time spent erroneously at liberty).
76. See id. (detailing appellant's arguments on appeal to Third Circuit).
77. See id. at 317 (declining to find due process violation and stating that com-
mon law doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty is sole basis upon which
appellant may request credit towards his federal sentence). For a further discus-
sion of the rulings of the Third Circuit on the appellant's request for credit for the
time he spent in state custody, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. See id. at 319-22 (establishing two-prong test that grants prisoner credit for
time erroneously at liberty only if defendant was negligently released by govern-
ment officials through no fault of the prisoner's own, and emphasizing lack of
specific findings regarding appellant's behavior while at liberty and remanding to
determine whether appellant thwarted governmental attempts at rearrest).
79. See id. at 317 (denying prisoner's assertion that he had due process right
to receive credit for time at liberty).
80. See id. at 316-17 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
847 n.8 (1998)) (adopting conscience-shocking standard for due process chal-
lenges to executive action). For a discussion of the test laid out by the Supreme
Court in Lewis, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
81. See id. at 317 (quoting Bonebrake v. Norris, 417 F.3d 938, 944 n.2 (8th Cir.
2005)) (internal quotations omitted) (describing nature of fights protected by due
process).
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concluded that denying Vega credit for time erroneously at liberty did not
violate his due process rights.
8 2
Although the Third Circuit failed to find a constitutional basis for
Vega's claim, the court recognized that he may have a valid claim under
the doctrine of credit for time erroneously at liberty.83 Considering the
various interpretations of the doctrine and the lack of Third Circuit prece-
dent regarding the issue, the court formulated a two-prong test aimed at
balancing the paramount interests at stake.8 4 As such, the Third Circuit
considered three interests: (1) simple fairness to the prisoner; (2) the
need to limit the arbitrary exercise of governmental power in executing
criminal sentences; and (3) the government's and society's interests in in-
carcerating and rehabilitating convicted criminals.8 5
First, the Third Circuit's test requires the prisoner to show that the
prisoner was prematurely released despite not serving his or her complete
sentence.8 6 If the prisoner can establish this, the burden then shifts to the
government to prove either: (1) that the imprisoning sovereign was not
negligent; or (2) that the prisoner obtained or retained liberty through his
or her own efforts. 87 If the government fails to meet its burden, the pris-
oner will be granted credit for the time spent at liberty.
8 8
In addition to formulating this two-prong test, the Third Circuit pro-
vided additional guidance for the district court in deciding whether to
grant credit for time spent at liberty.8 9 First, the Third Circuit stated that
simple or mere negligence, as opposed to gross negligence, will entitle a
prisoner to credit.9 0 To counteract this relatively low standard, the court
stated that the imprisoning sovereign, not an independent sovereign, must
be the negligent party.91 Further, the Third Circuit emphasized that the
82. See id. (relying on decisions in other jurisdictions to support finding that
denying credit for time at liberty does not violate appellant's due process rights).
83. See id. (citing cases from other jurisdictions prohibiting government from
delaying expiration of sentence or requiring prisoner to serve sentence in
installments).
84. See id. at 318 (recognizing need for guidance regarding how and when
doctrine should apply).
85. See id. (identifying three important interests at stake in erroneous release
cases).
86. See id. at 319 (placing initial burden on prisoner to show right to relief).
87. See id. (placing subsequent burden of proof on government to show why
prisoner is not entitled to relief).
88. See id. at 322 (explaining outcome if prisoner meets initial burden but
government fails to meet subsequent burden).
89. For a further discussion of the additional guidance provided by the Third
Circuit, see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
90. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 320 (establishing degree of government negligence
required to grant credit for time at liberty).
91. See id. (limiting negligence to imprisoning sovereign). In its opinion, the
Third Circuit acknowledges the circuit split regarding this issue. See id. (compar-
ing Fifth Circuit rule with Ninth Circuit rule). The court notes that the Ninth
Circuit considers a showing of negligence on the part of any governmental entity
sufficient, whereas the Fifth Circuit has denied credit when the release was the
[Vol. 53: p. 385
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government could not meet its burden under the second prong of the test
by showing that the prisoner did not take affirmative steps to effectuate his
or her own sentence.9 2 Based on its new two-prong test, the Third Circuit
remanded Vega's request for credit toward his federal sentence to the dis-
trict court for further consideration.93
IV. A MOUSE HAS SOME RIGHTS: FINDING A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR
AN ERRONEOUSLY RELEASED PRISONER'S CLAIM
As the Tenth Circuit stated in White, "[a] prisoner has some rights"
including the right to a continuous sentence, and the opportunity to re-
establish one's self in society. 94 Contrary to the Third Circuit's holding in
Vega, a prisoner may also have a fundamental, constitutionally-protected
interest in the finality of a criminal sentence if the prisoner's expectations
have crystallized. 95 In Vega, the Third Circuit did not analyze whether
reincarcerating Vega after a period of erroneous liberty would shock the
conscience, as required by the Supreme Court in Lewis.96 Instead, the
court focused on whether reincarcerating Vega would infringe upon a fun-
damental right.97 The Third Circuit held that Vega did not have a funda-
mental right to credit for time erroneously at liberty, but neglected to
consider whether Vega had a fundamental interest in the finality of his
mistake of an independent sovereign. See id. (same). The court analyzes the cir-
cuits' opposing views on the issue and is ultimately persuaded by the reasoning of
the Fifth Circuit. See id. (adopting Fifth Circuit rule to avoid windfalls to errone-
ously released prisoners).
92. See id. at 322 (establishing limitation on ways by which government can
meet its burden under second prong of test). The Third Circuit also noted that
while a prisoner who violates his or her parole or thwarts governmental attempts to
regain custody will not be entitled to credit, a prisoner who knows a mistake has
been made is not obligated to notify prison authorities of the mistake and may
nevertheless be granted credit. See id. (refusing to impose affirmative duty on pris-
oner to notify imprisoning sovereigns of mistakes).
93. See id. (providing instructions for district court on remand). Further-
more, the Third Circuit instructed the district court to consider first, whether the
State of New York was acting as an agent of the federal government and secondly,
whether the appellant frustrated the government's efforts to reincarcerate him af-
ter his erroneous release. See id. at 322-23 (outlining proper application of two-
prong test).
94. See White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) (establishing rule
against installment punishment).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1986) (rec-
ognizing that frustrating prisoner's settled expectations regarding finality may vio-
late due process). For a collection of cases acknowledging prisoner's interest in
the finality of his or her sentence, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
96. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 316-17 (acknowledging conscience-shocking standard
but proceeding immediately to question of whether government's conduct vio-
lated fundamental right).
97. See id. (failing to comment on whether government's conduct was con-
science-shocking and basing denial of due process claim on lack of fundamental
interest).
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sentence. 9 8 If Vega's expectations regarding the finality of his sentence
had crystallized, he may have a viable due process claim. 99
A. Examining the Conscience-Shocking Standard
The Third Circuit bypassed the question of whether reincarcerating
Vega would shock the conscience and, instead, focused on whether the
asserted liberty interest was fundamental.1 00 Although the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the conscience-shocking standard requires particu-
larly egregious behavior on the part of government officials, the Court has
also suggested that the required level of culpability depends on the con-
text of the situation. 10 1 To determine whether the government's conduct
was conscience-shocking in this particular context, the Third Circuit
should have considered a variety of factors, such as: the diligence of the
government in prompt correction of the error, 10 2 the appellant's progress
in rehabilitating and re-establishing himself,10 3 and the government's in-
terest in reincarceration 1 0 4 For instance, if the government showed a lack
of interest in Vega for a substantial period of time and afforded him the
98. See id. (concluding that credit for time erroneously spent at liberty is not
fundamental right without analyzing threshold question of whether governmental
behavior shocks contemporary conscience).
99. See generally United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1998) (rec-
ognizing that increasing sentence may violate due process if prisoner's expecta-
tions regarding its finality have crystallized).
100. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 317 (evading first part of Lewis test that requires
conscience-shocking conduct and referring to other courts that declined to find
due process violations in erroneous release cases).
101. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) ("Deliberate
indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in
another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of sub-
stantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse
of power is condemned as conscience-shocking."); see also Bonebrake v. Norris, 417
F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that whether actions are conscience-
shocking depends on circumstances surrounding actions).
102. See United States v. Mercedes, No. 90 Cr. 450, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3009, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1997) (listing various factors to be considered when
assessing due process claims in erroneous release cases including length of time
between mistake and correction).
103. SeeJohnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 873 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
government estopped from reincarcerating petitioner because he adjusted well to
society, was living with wife and children, operating agriculture business and abid-
ing by parole conditions); United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D.D.C.
1979) (acknowledging defendant's substantial adjustment to society, including get-
ting married, starting family, becoming active in church and becoming part-owner
and vice president of construction company; finding that reincarceration would
destroy life defendant has established and be inconsistent with fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice).
104. See United States v. Mazzoni, 677 F. Supp. 339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (stat-
ing that decision to reincarcerate erroneously released prisoner should involve
weighing government's interest in reincarceration against defendant's interest in
adjustment and progress in community life).
[Vol. 53: p. 385
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss2/4
2008] NOTE
opportunity to reintegrate into society, reincarcerating him may shock the
conscience and invoke due process protection.
10 5
B. Recognizing a Prisoner's Fundamental Interest in the Finality of a Sentence
In determining whether Vega's interest in credit for time at liberty
was fundamental, the Third Circuit should have considered case law sug-
gesting that a prisoner's interest in the finality of his or her sentence may
be considered fundamental in certain circumstances.10 6 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated in White, "[a] prisoner has some rights" including the right to a
continuous sentence and the opportunity to re-establish one's self in soci-
ety. 10 7 In addition, prisoners also have the right to settled expectations
regarding the finality of their criminal sentence in certain circum-
stances. 10 8 The fundamental nature of these rights has not only been rec-
ognized at common law, but is also implicit in the American legal tradition
and the concept of ordered liberty. 109
1. Finding a Constitutionally-Protected Interest in the Finality of a Criminal
Sentence
Although the Supreme Court has urged courts to be reluctant in rec-
ognizing new fundamental rights, some courts, including the Third and
Fourth Circuits, have alluded to a constitutionally-protected interest in the
105. See Merritt, 478 F. Supp. at 808 (holding that reincarcerating defendant,
who had spent substantial time at liberty and demonstrated exceptional progress
in rehabilitation, would be so inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty
and justice that it would "shock the conscience of the Court").
106. See United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
defendant does not automatically acquire vested interest, but instead needs to
demonstrate legitimate expectation of finality).
107. See White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) (establishing
rule against installment punishment).
108. See, e.g., Breest v. Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that
altering criminal sentence after substantial period of time may violate prisoner's
due process rights by postponing his or her parole eligibility or release date); Haw-
kins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 754 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)
(claiming that prisoner's liberty interest in preserving settled expectations regard-
ing finality of his sentence is fundamental).
109. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 743-59 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting) (referring to
prior case law and emphasis on finality of sentences in other aspects of American
criminal justice system to support determination that reincarcerating prisoner af-
ter period of erroneous release would violate due process).
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finality of a criminal sentence. 110 In Hawkins v. Freeman,"' the dissent
recognized the fundamental nature of this interest and argued that rein-
carcerating the appellant, who had been mistakenly granted parole years
earlier, violated due process. 112 The dissent noted that the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution not only guarantees fair process, but also con-
tains a substantive component that protects individual liberty beyond
those rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights." 3 Furthermore,
110. See, e.g., id. at 756 ("Fourth Circuit law provides that after an inmate is
released on parole, his reasonable expectation of continued freedom crystallizes
over time. Once crystallized, that reasonable expectation of freedom is a legiti-
mate liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). For a comprehensive
collection of cases recognizing prisoner's fundamental interest in the finality of
their sentences after their expectations have crystallized, see supra note 42. Those
cases expand substantive due process protection to rights that are not enumerated
in the Constitution, which the Supreme Court has expressly disfavored. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (affirming reluctance to
expand substantive due process and expressing preference to refer to constitu-
tional text for protection rather than substantive due process).
111. 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999).
112. See id. at 756-57 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's
opinion based on theory that prisoner has fundamental liberty interest in preserv-
ing settled expectations regarding finality of sentence).
113. See id. at 752-53 (establishing concept of substantive due process). The
dissent in Hawkins asserts that courts must use reasoned judgment to determine
what personal liberties warrant due process protection. See id. at 753 (proposing
that courts must use reasoned judgment in protecting fundamental liberties). Fur-
thermore, the dissent adopts Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe v. Ullman that due
process "cannot be determined by reference to any code," but it represents "the
balance with our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of the organized soci-
ety." See id. (Harlan,J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds) (quot-
ing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)) (arguing that due process is discrete
concept). In Poe, Justice Harlan further states in dissent,
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed
as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living
thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not
long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely
to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judg-
ment and restraint.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds) (arguing that statute prohibiting use of contraceptive devices and giving
of medical advice regarding devices invaded right to martial privacy and violated
substantive due process). The Supreme Court has embraced this flexible ap-
proach to defining fundamental interests as suggested by the various unemumer-
ated rights that it has found to be "fundamental" including, inter alia, the right to
marry, to have children and to direct one's children's upbringing. See Hawkins,
195 F.3d at 747-48 (contrasting unenumerated rights that Supreme Court has
found to have fundamental quality with asserted right to remain free on errone-
ously granted parole). Arguing for a flexible approach to defining fundamental
rights protected by the Due Process Clause, the dissent in Hawkins notes that the
right to marry is not mentioned in the Bill of Rights yet the Supreme Court found
restrictions on interracial marriage interfered with an aspect of liberty protected
by substantive due process. See id. at 753 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting) (arguing that
due process protects certain personal liberties from government interference); see
[Vol. 53: p. 385
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the dissent asserted that acknowledgment of this fundamental right does
not break new ground, considering that some courts have found it funda-
mentally unfair to increase a criminal sentence after a prisoner's expecta-
tions regarding its finality have crystallized.
1 14
As noted in the Hawkins dissent, the Fourth Circuit has considered a
prisoner's interest in the finality of his or her sentence fundamental in
other circumstances.1 15 In United States v. Lundien,'1 6 the Fourth Circuit
asserted that the due process clause imposes outer limits on the govern-
ment's ability to alter a criminal sentence. 117 In Lundien, the appellant
was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years on two separate counts.1 18
Five days later, however, the district court increased one of the sentences
to twenty years. 11 9 In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit claimed that the con-
cept of constitutional due process fairness should apply not only to the
trial itself but also to sentencing. 1 20 The court agreed with the First Cir-
cuit's finding in Breest v. Helgemoe,12 1 specifically that a prisoner's expecta-
tion of release on a certain date is of such a psychological importance that
it may be fundamentally unfair to frustrate this expectation by significantly
postponing this release. 122 In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit stated that it
also Lydon, supra note 29, at 575 (asserting that fundamental due process rights
should be viewed as existing along a broad continuum not restricted to textual
provisions of the Constitution and arguing for balancing approach to substantive
due process analysis). But see Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 748 (asserting that "liberty inter-
ests entitled to procedural due process protection may be created by state law as
well as the Constitution itself, those entitled to substantive due process protection
... are 'created only by the Constitution"' (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Re-
gents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985)).
114. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 754 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (asserting right
to crystallized expectations is fundamental interest).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1989) (assert-
ing that it would be fundamentally unfair and violate due process to enhance sen-
tence after defendant's expectations regarding its finality have crystallized).
116. 769 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1985).
117. See id. at 987 (recognizing limits on government's ability to alter sen-
tence, but finding that resentencing appellant was not fundamentally unfair be-
cause there was no evidence of improper motive in resentencing, and delay in
resentencing of five days was not enough time for expectations to crystallize).
118. See id. at 982 (detailing appellant's original sentences).
119. See id. at 982-83 (stating facts leading to appellant's due process and
double jeopardy claims).
120. See id. at 986 (expanding scope of due process protection to sentencing
phase).
121. 579 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1978) (recognizing temporal limit for amend-
ing sentence, but finding resentencing after two months did not exceed time limit,
and was thus not fundamentally unfair).
122. See Lundien, 769 F.2d at 987 (agreeing with principle stated in Breest that
frustrating prisoner's expectations regarding release date may violate due pro-
cess). As cited by the Fourth Circuit, the First Circuit stated in Breest:
[T]he power of a sentencing court to correct even a statutorily invalid
sentence must be subject to some temporal limit. When a prisoner first
commences to serve his sentence, especially if it involves a long prison
term . . . the prospect of release . . . may seem but a dimly perceived,
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may be a denial of due process to increase defendants' sentences after
their expectations regarding the finality of the sentence have crystal-
lized. 12 3 To disregard and frustrate the prisoners' expectations after crys-
tallization would be fundamentally unfair and would violate due
process. 124
The theory that prisoners have a fundamental interest in the finality
of their sentence is closely linked with, and finds support in, the common
law rule that a prisoner has the right to serve a prompt, continuous sen-
tence and cannot be required to serve it in installments.' 25 The majority
of courts agree that the government cannot delay the expiration of crimi-
nal sentences by postponing the beginning of these sentences or by releas-
ing prisoners only to imprison them later.12 6 Allowing the executive
branch this type of authority would promote exactly the kind of arbitrary
largely unreal hope. As the months and years pass, however, the date of
that prospect must assume a real and psychologically critical importance.
The prisoner may be aided in enduring his confinement and coping with
the prison regime by the knowledge that with good behavior release on
parole or release outright will be achieved on a date certain. After a sub-
stantial period of time, therefore, it might be fundamentally unfair, and
thus violative of due process for a court to alter even an illegal sentence
in a way which frustrates a prisoner's expectations by postponing his pa-
role eligibility or release date far beyond that originally set.
Id. (quoting Breest, 579 F.2d at 101).
123. See id. (recognizing that increasing criminal sentence after expectations
have crystallized may violate due process, but finding no violation because period
of incarceration was too short for expectations to crystallize).
124. See id. (noting fundamental unfairness of increases in sentencing after
crystallization of expectation).
125. See White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) (establishing
rule against serving criminal sentence in installments); accord Shields v. Beto, 370
F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that requiring defendant to serve full sen-
tence after twenty-eight years spent erroneously at liberty would violate due pro-
cess because prisoner cannot be required to serve sentence in installments); see also
Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1937) (stating that "prisoner is entitled
to serve his time promptly if such is the judgment imposed .... ).
126. See Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
common law rule that, "unless interrupted by fault of prisoner," sentence contin-
ues to run because prisoner cannot be required to serve sentence in installments).
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit provides an example demonstrating this princi-
ple. See id. (explaining rule against installment punishment). The court said that
if a defendant begins serving a five-year sentence on July 1, 1990, but was released
betweenJanuary 1, 1992, and December 31, 1992, expiration of the sentence could
not be postponed from June 30, 1995, to June 30, 1996. See id. (illustrating rule
against installment punishment). In this situation, the Seventh Circuit claims the
sentence would expire on June 30, 1995, even though the prisoner only served
four out of the five years. See id. (same); see also Shields, 370 F.2d at 1005-06 (hold-
ing that reincarceration of appellant after twenty-eight years at liberty would im-
pose installment punishment and violate due process because government had
waived jurisdiction).
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and capricious exercise of power that the Due Process Clause seeks to
prohibit.1 2
7
Moreover, delaying the expiration of a criminal sentence also jeopar-
dizes the prisoner's ability to reintegrate into society. 128 Courts, including
the First and Ninth Circuits, have held that where an erroneously released
prisoner demonstrates an exceptional adjustment to society, reincarcera-
tion would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and jus-
tice. 129 In United States v. Merritt,130 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia vacated the defendant's federal sentence largely
because the defendant demonstrated exceptional adjustment to society af-
ter being erroneously released on parole.' 3 ' Letters from friends and
neighbors attesting to the defendant's good character and his transforma-
tion into a productive, law-abiding citizen persuaded the court. 13 2 The
court dismissed the sentence after concluding that reincarceration would
jeopardize the defendant's rehabilitation, disrupt the productive life he
had established and "be inconsistent with fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice."'133
Assuming that a prisoner's interest in the finality of his or her sen-
tence is classified as fundamental, the government may not infringe upon
this right unless the infringement is "narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
127. See Smith, 91 F.2d at 262 (holding that sentence of appellant ran from
date ordered to serve and placed in custody of marshal despite marshal's failure to
place appellant in proper custody and stating that any other holding would allow
arbitrary and capricious exercise of governmental power). In furtherance of its
opinion, the court in Smith theorized that absent a continuous sentence, a prisoner
sentenced for one year could "be required to wait forty years under the shadow of
[an] unserved sentence" before the marshal decides to execute the sentence. See
id. (providing rationale for court's holding).
128. See Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336 ("The government is not permitted to play cat
and mouse with the prisoner, delaying indefinitely the expiation of his debt to
society and his reintegration into the free community.").
129. See DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering "for-
mation of new roots" when determining if increase in sentence after prisoner had
been released on parole violated due process); Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868,
873 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding reincarceration of prisoner mistakenly paroled
would violate due process because it would disrupt prisoner's family life, his em-
ployees' lives and "affairs of his business creditors, and threaten his own long-term
adjustment to society"); United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D.D.C.
1979) (vacating sentence of erroneously released prisoner because reincarceration
of prisoner who successfully adjusted to society and progressed into law-abiding
citizen "would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice"
and shock conscience of court).
130. 478 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1979).
131. See id. at 807-08 (granting defendant's motion to vacate sentence upon
finding that defendant did not contribute to early release, marshal gave defendant
incorrect information about execution of detainer and reincarceration would
'jeopardize defendant's long-term adjustment to society").
132. See id. at 808 n.12 (noting letters from acquaintances of defendant refer-
ing to him as "conscientious . .. respectful .. .[an] asset to the community").
133. See id. at 808 (vacating sentence because reincarceration of rehabilitated
defendant would be conscience-shocking).
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ling state interest."1 34 Although the government has a strong interest in
protecting public safety and rehabilitating criminals, this interest becomes
less paramount if a prisoner has spent a substantial period of time at lib-
erty and no longer threatens society.' 3 5 In addition, the government does
not sacrifice its interest in deterring future crime by granting prisoners
relief in compelling situations. 13 6 As the dissent suggested in Hawkins, it is
unlikely that "an individual will be less deterred from committing a crime"
because of the chance that he or she will be erroneously released.
1 37
Like the defendants in Hawkins, Lundien and Breest, Vega also has a
fundamental interest in the finality of his sentence. 138 If his expectations
regarding the finality of his sentence have crystallized, it would be funda-
mentally unfair to require Vega to serve the remainder of his sentence.
139
Reincarceration would violate Vega's due process rights by postponing the
duration and finality of his original sentence, requiring him to serve his
sentence in installments and jeopardizing his successful reintegration into
the community. 140 Furthermore, the government may not infringe upon
Vega's fundamental interest unless the infringement is "narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest."14' If Vega has adjusted to
134. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (asserting that
government cannot infringe upon fundamental liberty interests "unless the in-
fringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest") (citation
omitted).
135. See Lydon, supra note 29, at 588 (recognizing government's legitimate
interests in preventing crime, punishing criminals and protecting public, but im-
plying that these interests subside in situations where prisoner has been
rehabilitated).
136. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 757 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that state's interest in deterrence does not survive strict
scrutiny and reincarceration "is not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling in-
terest in general or specific deterrence").
137. See id. (explaining why state does not have compelling interest in
deterrence).
138. For a further discussion of Hawkins, Lundien and Breest, see supra notes
108-24 and accompanying text.
139. See United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1985) (asserting
that altering sentence after crystallization of defendant's expectations of sentence
finality would violate due process).
140. See Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining ef-
fect of time erroneously at liberty on expiration of sentence); Johnson v. Williford,
682 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that reincarcerating rehabilitated peti-
tioner would jeopardize long-term readjustment and violate due process); see also
Sanchez v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 329 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206 (D.N.H. 2004)
(recognizing that denial of credit for time at liberty that would affect duration of
prisoner's confinement and require prisoner to serve sentence in installments may
implicate due process protection).
141. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (asserting that
government cannot infringe upon fundamental liberty interests "unless the in-
fringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest") (citation
omitted).
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society and refrained from criminal misconduct since his release, the gov-
ernment no longer has a compelling interest in his rehabilitation.
14 2
2. Examining American Legal Tradition
Aside from precedent identifying prisoners' fundamental, constitu-
tionally-protected interest in the finality of their sentences, an analysis of
American legal tradition also suggests that this interest is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. 143 As suggested by the dissent in Hawkins, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution demonstrates the importance
of preserving the finality of judgments. 14 4 This clause prohibits multiple
prosecutions for the same offense based on the principle that the govern-
ment cannot repeatedly attempt to convict a person, compelling that per-
son to live in a constant state of anxiety and insecurity. 145 In addition, the
Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause may prohibit
increasing the length of a criminal sentence after conviction in cases
142. See Lydon, supra note 29, at 588 (suggesting that government's interest in
reincarcerating erroneously released prisoner may be diminished if prisoner has
been at liberty for extended period of time and is no longer threat to society).
143. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 758-60 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan, J., dissent-
ing) (performing Glucksberghistorical inquiry and finding appellant's right to resist
reincarceration and protect "settled expectation[s] of freedom" was sufficiently
rooted in legal tradition to be considered fundamental). In Hawkins, the majority
declined to follow the principles stated in Lundien and Cook because these cases
did not perform the Glucksberginquiry into history and legal tradition to determine
whether the right asserted was fundamental and protected by due process. See id.
at 748-49 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Lundien and Cook and dismissing prin-
ciples cited by defendant as dicta). In response to the majority's argument, the
dissent in Hawkins performed the Glucksberg inquiry and found the asserted liberty
interest was, in fact, fundamental. See id. at 759 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (ana-
lyzing legal tradition and concluding that interest in "settled expectation[s] of
freedom" and finality of sentence is implicit in American legal system). The dis-
sent recognized the lack of historical data regarding erroneous release cases, but
nevertheless found the importance of finality of judgments and preservation of
settled expectations stressed throughout the American legal tradition. See id. at
758-59 (same). The dissent specifically refers to the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Ex Post Facto Clause and the presumption against retroactive application of new
laws, and concludes that the right to preserve settled expectations and the need for
finality are fundamental to our system of justice. See id. (same).
144. See id. at 758 (asserting that principles on which double jeopardy clause
is based suggest that prisoner's interest in finality of sentence is fundamental).
The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no "person [shall] be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. See 21 Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 323 (2007) (stating that double jeop-
ardy clause prohibits (1) "second prosecution for same offense after acquittal"; (2)
"second prosecution for same offense after conviction"; and (3) "multiple punish-
ments for same offense"); see also Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, DoubleJeopardy
Considerations in Federal Criminal Cases-Supreme Court Cases, 162 A.L.R. FED. 415
(2007) (collecting Supreme Court cases analyzing scope of double jeopardy clause
in federal criminal cases).
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where the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in the
sentence.
146
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution further suggests the im-
portance of settled expectations regarding criminal sentencing. 14 7 This
clause prohibits the government from enacting ex post facto laws, which
either retrospectively criminalize actions that were legal when committed,
or change the punishment prescribed for the crime. 148 The purpose of
the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give citizens fair warning regarding the legal
consequences of certain acts and allow convicted persons to build realistic
expectations regarding the length of their imprisonment. 149 Accordingly,
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, which are fundamental to
American legal tradition, stress the importance of finality and suggest that
a prisoner's right to preserve settled expectations is constitutionally-
protected. 15 0
V. PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE CAT AND THE MOUSE:
EXPANDING THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S Two-PRONG TEST
Assuming, arguendo, that Vega's asserted liberty interest is not pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, a totality of circumstances approach
would be a more effective means of balancing the competing interests at
stake than the two-prong test employed by the Third Circuit. 151 As the
court suggests in Vega, there are three competing interests that must be
addressed in erroneous-release cases: (1) "simple fairness toward the pris-
oner"; (2) the need to limit the arbitrary use of governmental power; and
(3) the interests of the government and society in seeing that criminals
146. See United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 1996) (vacating re-
sentencing order because reimposition of sentence on counts upon which defen-
dant had fully satisfied sentence violated double jeopardy clause based on
Supreme Court guidance).
147. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 759 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
principles on which ex post facto clause is based suggest prisoner's interest in final-
ity of sentence is fundamental); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (stating that "[n]o
state shall . . . pass any ... ex post facto law").
148. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining ex post facto
law as "[a] law that impermissibly applies retroactively, esp[ecially] in a way that
negatively affects a person's rights, as by criminalizing an action that was legal
when it was committed"); see also 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 643 (2007)
(discussing prohibitions afforded by ex post facto clause).
149. See Constitutional Law, supra note 148 (discussing purpose of prohibitions
afforded by ex post facto clause); see also Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 759 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that purpose of ex post facto clause is to "preserve settled
expectations" and suggesting that concept of finality is deeply embedded in Ameri-
can legal tradition).
150. See Hawkins, 195 F.3d at 759 (arguing that interest in settled expectations
regarding finality of criminal sentence is implicit in American legal tradition).
151. See generally Lydon, supra note 29 (advocating balancing approach for
analyzing due process claims made in erroneous release cases). For a further dis-
cussion of the interests at stake and the weaknesses of the Third Circuit's two-
prong test, see infra notes 159-78 and accompanying text.
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pay their debts to society. 152 First, the Third Circuit's two-prong test may
not ensure fairness to the prisoner because it focuses solely on the impris-
oning sovereign's negligence and the prisoner's contributing fault,
neglecting other important factors. 153 The test neglects to consider cru-
cial factors-including the time spent at liberty, the prisoner's re-adjust-
ment into society and the government's degree of negligence. 154 A
totality of the circumstances approach would allow courts to weigh these
factors and provide for more equitable results in cases of erroneous re-
lease or delayed incarceration.1 55 For instance, where the government
was grossly negligent in allowing the prisoner to remain at liberty for an
extended period of time and the prisoner has made significant progress in
re-establishing himself in society, fairness to the prisoner would outweigh
the government's interest in reincarceration.1
5 6
152. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2007) (announcing
three paramount interests to consider "when determining whether erroneously re-
leased prisoner should be granted credit for time" at liberty).
153. See id. at 319 (establishing two-prong test "requiring government to
prove either (1) that there was no negligence on part of imprisoning sovereign, or
(2) that prisoner obtained or retained liberty through own efforts").
154. See DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering and
weighing factors such as period of time since release, reason for release and forma-
tion of new roots to determine whether reincarceration of parolee would violate
due process).
155. See id. (holding that court could not reinstate petitioner's original life
sentence that had been suspended after petitioner came to aid of prison guard in
prison fight because petitioner had been paroled for number of years, obtained
work and established relationships); United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 864
(9th Cir. 1988) (referring to cases examining totality of circumstances when execu-
tion of sentence was delayed);Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 873 n.3 (9th Cir.
1982) (finding that government was estopped from reincarcerating erroneously
paroled petitioner because it would disrupt petitioner's family, employees and bus-
iness creditors, and 'jeopardize petitioner's long-term adjustment"); United States
v. Mazzoni, 677 F. Supp. 339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that "a decision to re-
commit defendant requires consideration of defendant's behavior while on release
as well as a weighing of the government's interest in reincarceration against defen-
dant's interest in adjustment and progress in community life"); United States v.
Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that defendant's exceptional
adjustment and progress vindicated state's judgment that reincarceration would
disrupt family, "destroy economic base" and threaten long-term adjustment). See
generally Zitter, supra note 7 (collecting cases in which courts considered totality of
circumstances surrounding delay in execution of sentence to determine what ef-
fect delay should have on sentence).
156. See Johnson, 682 F.2d at 873 n.3 (finding that government was estopped
from reincarcerating erroneously paroled petitioner because it would disrupt peti-
tioner's family, employees and business creditors, and 'jeopardize petitioner's
long-term adjustment"); Merritt, 478 F. Supp. at 808 (vacating federal sentence af-
ter defendant had been paroled for three years during which he married, started
family, became active in church and became part owner and vice president of
company).
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Additionally, a totality of the circumstances approach would more ef-
fectively safeguard against the arbitrary use of governmental power.'
5 7
The Third Circuit's two-prong test only requires negligence on the part of
the imprisoning sovereign. 15 8 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held in Clark
v. Floyd159 that negligence on the part of any government entity entitles
the prisoner to credit for time at liberty. 160 There, the appellant spent
nearly three years erroneously at liberty after state authorities failed to no-
tify federal authorities of the appellant's release from state custody.
161
The Ninth Circuit granted the appellant credit toward his federal sentence
because he was inadvertently released by a government agent through no
fault of his own. 1 6 2 Other courts have also granted relief in similar situa-
tions based on the presumption that federal authorities are responsible for
staying abreast of the status of a state prisoner who must also serve a fed-
eral sentence.
16 3
On the other hand, the Third Circuit was correct in holding that pris-
oners do not have an affirmative duty to effectuate their sentences.
1 6 4
The majority of courts agree that no relief is warranted to a prisoner who
escapes from custody, violates parole conditions or thwarts the govern-
ment's efforts to regain custody.165 Although courts tend to look more
favorably on prisoners who notify authorities of mistakes regarding re-
157. See generally Lydon, supra note 29 (asserting that waiver and balancing
tests are flexible enough to grant relief in compelling situations).
158. See Vega, 493 F.3d at 321 (stating that credit should not be granted where
negligence was on part of independent sovereign instead of imprisoning entity).
For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's opposing view finding credit may be granted
upon showing of negligence of any governmental entity, see infra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
159. 80 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996).
160. See id. at 374 (granting credit against federal sentence for time spent
erroneously at liberty due to negligence of state authorities).
161. See id. at 372-73 (establishing events leading to petitioner-appellant's er-
roneous release by state authorities and subsequent arrest by federal authorities).
162. See id. at 374 (granting credit because prisoner was released by inadver-
tence of government agent without consideration of whether negligent party was
imprisoning sovereign).
163. Cf United States v. Mercedes, No. 90 Cr. 450, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3009, at *114-15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1997) (vacating defendant's federal sentence
even though he was erroneously released by state authorities because federal au-
thorities showed lack of diligence in ensuring sentence was carried out).
164. See Chin, supra note 6, at 414 (asserting that federal case law suggests that
prisoner's awareness of mistake does not affect his or her ability to be granted
credit). Chin implies that it would be unfair to presume defendants "can correctly
calculate their sentences to the day" given the complexity of some sentencing re-
gimes and the plethora of permissible forms of release. See id. at 415 (demonstrat-
ing that defendant's knowledge regarding error in release should not preclude
defendant from credit).
165. See e.g., White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) ("Nor can
there be any doubt that an escaped prisoner cannot be credited with the time he is
at large."). The court noted that prisoners who violate parole or demonstrate fault
may not be credited. See id. (describing situations in which former prisoner will
not be given credit for time at liberty).
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lease, it does not follow that a prisoner has an affirmative duty to aid in the
execution of his or her sentence.1 6
6
Under Title 28 Section 516 of the United States Code, the United
States Department of Justice is responsible for prosecuting all federal of-
fenses. 167 In addition, the Department of Justice must also ensure that
defendants are taken into custody and that their criminal sentences are
diligently executed.1 68 Therefore, it seems appropriate that the govern-
ment alone should bear the consequences of its mistakes, especially be-
cause it is in the best position to prevent erroneous releases and delayed
incarcerations.169 By ensuring that convicted criminals are taken into cus-
tody in a timely manner and held for the duration of their sentences, the
government can prevent the doctrine of credit for time at liberty from
ever applying. 170 Moreover, to place an affirmative duty on the convicted
person would be ineffective, as convicts will not likely be eager to effectu-
ate their sentences, and inconsistent with an adversarial system of
justice. 17 1
166. See United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861,866 (9th Cir. 1988) (asserting
that defendant "has no affirmative duty to aid in the execution of his sentence");
United States v. Mazzoni, 677 F. Supp. 339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Thus, defen-
dant's failure to come forward on his own initiative does not rise to the level of
wrongful conduct that limits the continuity of his sentence."); see also Chin, supra
note 6, at 413 (noting that compelling case for granting credit is when convicted
person attempts in good faith to begin or continue service but is denied by
authorities).
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2007) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a
party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.").
168. See Chin, sapra note 6, at 416-17 (suggesting government alone bears
burden of executing criminal sentences and prisoner has no duty in this regard).
In support of the proposition that the government alone is responsible for effectu-
ating criminal sentences, Chin cites a Supreme Court case stating:
(The district attorney] is specially charged with the prosecution of all de-
linquents for crimes and offences; and these duties do not end with the
judgment or order of the court. He is bound to provide the marshal with
all necessary process to carry into execution the judgment of the court.
Levy Court v. Ringgold, 30 U.S. 451, 454 (1831).
169. See Chin, supra note 6, at 416 (asserting that because government is re-
sponsible for executing criminal sentences, it should also bear consequences of its
errors in carrying out its duties). See id. at 433 (concluding that because govern-
ment is in best position to prevent mistakes in executing criminal sentences, it
should bear consequences of its mistakes).
170. See id. at 433 (concluding that doctrine of credit for time erroneously at
liberty would never apply if government made "sure that people who should be in
custody in fact are in custody").
171. See id. at 417 (stating that to expect defendants to ensure sentences are
properly executed would cause "mouse-guarding-the-cheese" problem and be in-
consistent with legal authorities suggesting that neither defendant nor defense
counsel is responsible for enforcing criminal judgments).
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VI. CONCLUSION
An individual's personal liberty is one of the inalienable, fundamental
and inherent rights afforded to American citizens. 172 This principle was
first expressed in the Declaration of Independence and later reinforced
through the Constitution of the United States. 173 Considering the strong
emphasis on protecting personal liberty inherent in the American legal
system, the Third Circuit should reconsider whether erroneously released
prisoners' interests in preserving their settled expectations of continued
freedom are fundamental and, therefore, constitutionally-protected.
174
While this theory is more liberal in granting relief to erroneously re-
leased prisoners, it is not without limitations.' 75 Prisoners must show that
their expectations regarding the finality of their sentences have crystal-
lized to the extent that reincarceration would significantly frustrate these
settled expectations.' 76 This theory will not result in windfalls to con-
victed criminals who have not served their debts to society, but instead will
grant equitable relief to prisoners who were released through no fault of
their own, spent a considerable time at liberty and have become produc-
tive members of the community.
1 77
Even if the Third Circuit fails to reconsider whether erroneously re-
leased prisoners have fundamental interests in the finality of their
sentences, the court should expand its two-prong test.' 78 In addition to
considering the government's negligence and the prisoner's contributing
fault, the court should consider factors such as the length of time spent at
liberty, the prisoner's progress in re-integrating into society and the pris-
172. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 560 (2007) (summarizing
sources of fundamental rights and privileges).
173. See id. (citing the Declaration of Independence, which states "all men...
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness"); see also id. (noting that Constitution
provides that "neither Congress nor states may deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law").
174. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 752-59 (4th Cir. 1999)
(MurnaghanJ., dissenting) (arguing that erroneously released prisoner has viable
due process claim based on prior case law and analysis of legal tradition).
175. See id. at 756 (conceding that most courts that recognize fundamental
nature of prisoner's interest in finality of his or her sentence have held for govern-
ment on facts).
176. See United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
"defendant... does not automatically acquire vested interest," but instead needs
to demonstrate "legitimate expectation of finality").
177, See DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that
"[o]nly in the extreme case can a court properly say that the later upward revision
of a sentence ... is so unfair that it must be deemed inconsistent with fundamental
notions of fairness ....").
178. For a discussion of why a totality of circumstances approach would more
effectively protect and balance the competing interests in erroneous release cases,
see supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
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oner's efforts in bringing the mistake to the attention of authorities.
179
This flexible approach will not only prevent unfair, unnecessary incarcera-
tion, but will also blow the whistle on this game of cat and mouse.
180
Danielle E. Wall
179. See generally Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (advocat-
ing totality of circumstances approach to due process analysis in erroneous release
cases).
180. See generally Lydon, supra note 29 (arguing that balancing test should be
used in due process challenges because it will prohibit reincarcerating rehabili-
tated individual when the state's interests or justifications for reimprisonment are
weak).
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